

The President's Daily Brief

14 September 1971

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
THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF


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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

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JORDAN - UNITED NATIONS


Jordan's insistent call for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to condemn Israel's activities in Jerusalem could produce a verbal donnybrook ranging over the entire Middle East problem. Some Arab governments may attempt to obtain a resolution stronger than the one submitted by Husayn.

Amman now has a draft incorporating various changes suggested by the Egyptians that is acceptable to the US as well. The Japanese delegate, who is this month's Council president, is planning to schedule the meeting within the week.

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No matter how it comes out, such a debate is not likely to alter Tel Aviv's policy of integrating Arab Jerusalem into Israel.



INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

The European Community finance ministers agreed yesterday on a set of recommendations for international monetary reform to present at the Group of Ten meeting in London on Wednesday. The recommendations include a return to fixed parities although with greater margins of flexibility; a devaluation of the dollar as part of general currency realignment; and a significant revaluation of the Japanese yen. They also call for a greater role for Special Drawing Rights in the creation of new international reserves.

The EC countries decided, however, to maintain their present national exchange-rate schemes for the time being. It remains to be seen how long they can do so before the disruption of Community economic life forces them to resolve their differences.

On Thursday the Council of the 76-member General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade most likely will accept the report of its working party that criticizes the US surcharge as "inappropriate." It is unlikely, however, that the GATT contracting parties will retaliate by withdrawing equivalent tariff concessions.

NOTE

USSR:

Kosygin was injured in an automobile accident on 3 September. He was taken immediately to the Kremlin polyclinic in downtown Moscow and later that evening to the hospital in suburban Kuntsevo where he apparently spent the night. Kosygin's injuries were described as minor, however, and he met with UK former prime minister Wilson today, according to press reports.

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INDIA-PAKISTAN

Mrs. Gandhi may well make her final decision on whether or not to invade East Pakistan in the next few weeks. By early October, or even sooner, the end of the monsoon rains will make large-scale operations in East Pakistan possible. Although it is conceivable that war could be forced upon India by some pre-emptive move of the Pakistanis, it is more likely to be a conscious decision based on domestic political pressures, the continuing refugee flow, and fear that, without intervention, East Pakistan eventually will be taken over by leftists.

So far, Mrs. Gandhi has been able to withstand the critics--both in the opposition and within her own party--of her Bangla Desh policy. Since parliament will not convene before late October, she faces no immediate political problem.

Mrs. Gandhi could, however, decide it is worth a war to stop the refugee flow, if it goes on much longer. There are now almost 8.5 million refugees in India, according to Indian figures, and the end of the monsoon may bring more. When the rains stop, West Pakistani troops will be able to move more easily throughout the East. Unless they can restore stability soon, there will be more fighting, burning of villages, and army brutality and more Bengalis will have cause to flee. The same will happen if the government fails in its efforts to avert widespread food shortages. On the other hand President Yahya's moves towards a political accommodation may work to reduce the refugee flow.

Bengali reaction to these moves will also become clearer during the next few weeks. Yahya has appointed a civilian governor in the East--who has been criticized in some quarters as a tired old man, in others as a quisling--and has issued a new amnesty proclamation for all insurgents except a few hundred leaders. At the same time, the trial of East Pakistani leader Mujibur Rahman continues, and whatever Yahya's intentions he has not said publicly that Mujib's life will be spared. Yahya has taken several steps toward elections, but in doing so he has disqualified over half the East Pakistanis who won national and provincial assembly seats last December, and apparently has postponed the establishment of civilian government until some time next year. If these steps convince Bengalis that there is some hope for an acceptable political solution, they will be less likely to flee to India. The mistrust that has been built up, however, makes the Bengalis skeptical of anything Yahya says.

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The Bengalis in contact with our consulate in Calcutta tell us they are still willing to negotiate--pre-sumably for something less than total independence-but say that Mujib must be freed first and that there must be an amnesty for everyone--conditions Yahya is unlikely to accept. A Bengali representative cautioned, however, that if we talk to the Bangla Desh foreign minister he may take an even harder line and demand complete independence.


The leftists pose no immediate threat to the Bengali insurgent movement, but they are growing stronger. The most extreme Communist faction already has a fairly successful guerrilla band in the field. Last spring the leftists could be ignored by both the Bangla Desh government and the Indians, but now several groups of leftists have been included in a Bangla Desh Liberation Front. Those who are prosoviet were included partly because Moscow insisted on this as the price for continued support. Although there is a good chance that the leftists could be forestalled even if India delays military action, some of Mrs. Gandhi's advisers will argue that any delay will turn the insurgents further from India.

There are also some strong arguments against India's going to war that may be persuasive with Mrs. Gandhi. Yahya has made it clear that an invasion of East Pakistan will mean war with West Pakistan as well, and the Indians—although confident they can win—recognize that fighting on the West Pakistan border will be very costly. They are also worried about Chinese intervention, and know that weather in the Himalayas will not stop Chinese troop movements for at least the next three months. The Indian Government still appears to be divided on its assessment of Chinese intentions, and its final estimate could be crucial in deciding whether to risk war. We have seen no indication that China intends to intervene or is making any preparations to do so,

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The Soviets clearly do not want a war on the subcontinent and will continue to urge restraint. The Indians claim, however, that they have not threatened to cut off arms supplies and in fact have promised India more sophisticated weapons. The Indians may not be sure what Moscow will do if India is clearly the aggressor, but they apparently expect that they

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would still get some Soviet support. Mrs. Gandhi is going to Moscow on 27 September and what she learns there could affect her final decision. The Indians are well aware, on the other hand, that US economic aid is likely to stop if they go to war, but they survived a temporary halt in aid in 1965 when their economy was in much worse shape than now. They may believe that whatever they do, Washington will not halt aid permanently.

Military preparations are continuing on both sides, and in many cases surpass those made before the war in 1965. The recent movement of units of India's only armored division, plus an independent armored brigade, toward the border with West Pakistan reflects Indian contingency planning against the event Mrs. Gandhi opts for war. Even if she does not, the presence of the armored division in forward areas may act to deter Pakistan from a pre-emptive strike.

With the addition of the armored division and the independent brigade, total Indian strength in the Kashmir-Punjab region will be increased to over 220,000. New Delhi probably sees no need now for further shifts of its forces to the West Pakistan border area.

On its border with East Pakistan India now has about 100,000 troops. There has been no known augmentation of these forces since June, but there may be some shifting of brigades from mountain divisions--normally facing China--to the forces directly along the border.

For its part, Pakistan may well shift more of its troops. As of 19 August, satellite photography showed that the bulk of both of Pakistan's armored divisions were still in the normal garrison areas at Multan and Kharian. If Pakistan intends to launch an attack-or expects India to do so-both divisions would certainly be moved closer to the border.

There have been reports that Pakistan might send another division to the East to strengthen the some 70,000 troops already there. For the moment we do not consider such a move likely, since these forces are needed more in the west where the bulk of the fighting would occur if war erupts.

The Pakistan Air Force has begun dispersing some of its fighter aircraft to recently reactivated reserve fields. To date at least one squadron of MIG-19s has been moved from Sarghoda to Shorkot Road. Presumably other squadrons of MIG-19s will also be moved to other reserve airfields, but there is no evidence that such moves have taken place.

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There is some ind	ication that	the Indian	Air Force,
like that of Paki	stan, may be	dispersing	some of
its aircraft to r	eserve airfi	elds. Sate	llite photog
raphy	showed MIG	-21s and ei	ther Hawker
Hunters or Myster		reserve air	fields in
northwest India w	hich have no	t been used	! for several
years.			

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Both sides are taking increased defensive measures at their airfields. satellite photography shows new defensive measures at both Indian and Pakistani airfields near the border, including construction of revetments, use of camouflage, and deployment of additional antiaircraft guns into field positions.

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There is some evidence that the Indian Air Force has begun stockpiling petroleum and probably munitions and spare parts as well.